Websites detect proxies mostly by the address. They look it up in lists of proxies, VPNs, Tor exits and hosting networks, and check what that one address has done before. Then they read what the connection itself shows: proxy headers, the fingerprint of the software that connects, the timing of the handshakes, behavior and browser leaks.
Residential proxies are detected too. Detection vendors list residential proxy exits, a research team catches them by timing, and Cloudflare scores their traffic request by request. On October 22, 2026, an IP reputation check flagged 98.9% of the 4,469 working free proxies we track on home and business networks.
How do websites detect proxies?
A site, or a service it pays for, reads several signals and weighs them together. These are the ones that vendors and researchers document:
| Signal | What the site reads | Works over https |
|---|---|---|
| Address lists | Whether the address is a known proxy, VPN, Tor exit or hosting range | Yes |
| Address reputation | Abuse reports against that one address | Yes |
| Network records | Who holds the address and who routes it | Yes |
| Location | Where the address really sits, from delay | Yes |
| Proxy headers | Via, Forwarded or X-Forwarded-For in the request | No, plain http only |
| TLS fingerprint | Which software opened the encrypted connection | Yes |
| HTTP/2 fingerprint | The client's settings values and header order | Yes |
| TCP stack | Which operating system sent the packets | Yes |
| Timing | The gap between the TCP and TLS round trips | Yes |
| Behavior | Request rate and how pages are loaded | Yes |
| Browser leaks | WebRTC addresses and the automation flag | Yes, in a browser |
The rest of this page takes them in that order, with the source for each: vendor documents, IETF standards, peer-reviewed studies and our own measurements.
The address: lists and reputation
Most detection starts with a lookup. MaxMind's Anonymous IP database marks addresses as public proxies, hosting providers, Tor exit nodes or residential proxies. IP2Location's IP2Proxy sorts them into nine types, residential proxies among them. Cloudflare gives its Enterprise customers ready-made lists of open proxies, anonymizers and VPNs.
These lists work address by address, so a known proxy on a home network is listed like any other. We measured this on the free proxies our checker tracks:
The free proxies on home and business networks even carried more abuse reports: 96.4%, against 73.0% on datacenter networks. The largest of those networks were carriers such as PLDT in the Philippines, Korea Telecom and Cox Communications.
Free proxies are the easy case, because they are public. Paid residential exits were far harder to list when researchers first measured them. Xianghang Mi and colleagues found 6 million residential proxy addresses in more than 230 countries, in a study published in 2019. Only 2.20% appeared on public blacklists or threat intelligence platforms. The lists have moved since, and MaxMind and IP2Proxy now carry a residential type. We know of no public figure for how many paid exits they catch today.
The network: who holds an address and who routes it
A lookup of the network reads public records. The ASN names the network that routes the address, and the registry names the organization that holds it. A hosting company in either record is the oldest tell there is, and it is what exposes a plain datacenter proxy.
The two records can also be compared with each other. Ben Du and colleagues built a test that flags a block when its holder and its routing network have no business link, which usually means a lease. It reached 98% precision and 82% recall on 14,856 checked prefixes, in a paper for IMC 2024. Our page on what an ISP proxy is explains why that split matters.
Labels are softer than the records under them. Data companies decide whether a network is an ISP or a hosting company, and they often disagree. Maya Ziv and colleagues tested seven data sources in 2021. Most were "nearly two times worse" at sorting technology organizations, such as ISPs and hosting companies, than at sorting other kinds. So a checker's "datacenter" or "residential" is one company's estimate.
Location: delay turns into distance
A site can test where an address really sits. A signal in fiber covers a limited distance per millisecond, so a round-trip time sets an upper limit on how far away a server can be. Zachary Weinberg and colleagues used such timings on 2,269 servers from seven VPN services for IMC 2018. The services claimed 222 countries and territories between them.
- Credible44%
- Uncertain28%
- False28%
The servers were "concentrated in countries where server hosting is cheap and reliable", such as the Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands. A claimed country is therefore something a site can check.
Commercial location databases do not always catch this. For IMC 2026, Robert Beverly and colleagues audited 62,084 IPv4 prefixes by delay. Of the prefixes they placed outside the registered region, three commercial databases flagged between 7% and 92%, depending on the database and the region. A household's exit sits where the household sits, so this test mainly troubles proxies run from servers.
Headers, on plain http only
The HTTP standard asks every proxy to announce itself. RFC 9110 says: "A proxy MUST send an appropriate Via header field". RFC 7239 defines a Forwarded header that can carry "the originating IP address of a request", and many proxies send X-Forwarded-For instead.
Free proxies follow that rule more often than not. On October 22, 2026, 86.0% of the 3,089 free proxies that relayed a plain HTTP request to our test server named a proxy in a header. Our guide to the anonymous proxy detected message breaks those grades down.
Over https, headers drop out. The browser asks the proxy for a tunnel with the CONNECT method, and RFC 9110 then limits the proxy to "blind forwarding of data". HTTP Archive's Web Almanac 2024 counted 98% of mobile requests on encrypted connections. So on most sites, headers say nothing about the proxy.
Fingerprints of the software that connects
The same tunnel passes your TLS handshake through unchanged. That handshake lists ciphers, extensions and curves in an order typical of the software that built it. JA3 turns five of those fields into a 32-character MD5 fingerprint. JA4+, its successor from FoxIO, is a suite of fingerprints that are "both human and machine readable".
Cloudflare reads both for its Enterprise Bot Management customers. Its help page calls the fingerprint "a stable identifier across different destination IPs, ports, and certificates". In plain words, it follows the software from one proxy address to the next. Our guide to JA3 and JA4 explains the fields.
That fingerprint is hard to fake. Sergey Frolov and Eric Wustrow studied over 11.8 billion TLS connections for NDSS 2019. They found many circumvention tools "easily distinguishable from the real-world traffic they attempt to mimic", even after those tools had tried to copy popular clients.
HTTP/2 adds a second fingerprint. In a 2017 white paper, Akamai showed that the SETTINGS values a client sends, and the order of its pseudo-headers, identify the client software.
The operating system can show too. A proxy opens its own TCP connection to the site, so the packets the site receives come from the proxy's machine. Blake Anderson and David McGrew identified operating systems from TCP/IP, TLS and HTTP features with 99.4% accuracy on major versions, on a private network. If a browser says Windows and the packets look like Linux, the two stories disagree. We found no public figure for how many sites make that comparison.
Timing: how residential proxies give themselves away
A residential proxy leaves a trace in its path. A team from EURECOM, KAUST and Amadeus describes it in a 2023 study: residential proxies "break the tcp session between client and server but maintain the tls one end-to-end". The server's TCP handshake ends at the proxy device, while the TLS handshake travels on to the real client.
So the server measures both round trips and compares them. In a four-month campaign, a gap above 50 milliseconds marked a residential proxy request. In earlier work by the same group, 96.57% of residential proxy connections showed a gap above 88.5 milliseconds. The method catches any proxy that splits the connection this way, VPNs and Tor included. It is also the subject of a US patent application, published in November 2023.
A second team found the same gap from the other side. Diwen Xue and colleagues at the University of Michigan placed their observer near the client, as a censor would sit, for NDSS 2025. On visits to the top 5,000 domains through obfuscated proxies, about 80% of domains produced at least one flow with the gap. The false positive rate was held at about 1%. They call the split "an inherent characteristic shared by all proxying and tunneling protocols", so encryption alone does not remove it.
The method has blind spots. Some mobile networks split TCP connections too, and the authors found those can look like proxies. Browsers and phone hotspots changed the measurement "only marginally".
Behavior, request by request
Cloudflare set out its own approach in a 2024 post. Every hour, its model was classifying "more than 17 million unique IPs" that took part in residential proxy attacks. It also found that 4 of 5 requests from those networks came straight from the households' own devices.
That second number shapes the method. Cloudflare names data center addresses and known open proxies as the simplest IP signals. For residential addresses, its model "identifies residential proxy abuse without resorting to IP blocking", because blocking "can cause false positives for legitimate users".
Commercial anti-bot services combine this with fingerprints of the browser. Babak Amin Azad and colleagues tested them for DIMVA 2020. More than 75% of protected sites stopped basic bots built on Python scripts or PhantomJS. Less common automation setups, such as Safari on a Mac or Chrome on Android, got past the protection on up to 82% of sites. These defenses are strongest against what they have seen most.
Leaks from the browser
Two browser features can undo a proxy from the inside. RFC 8828 warns that WebRTC's connection checks "will bypass the proxy and reveal the public IP address of the client" when direct internet access is allowed. A browser under automation also says so: navigator.webdriver is true, for example in Chrome started with --headless, as MDN documents.
Can websites detect residential proxies?
Yes, by three routes. Lists cover them: MaxMind has an is_residential_proxy flag, IP2Proxy a residential type, and Spur sells data to "detect VPNs, residential proxies, and bots". Timing catches the split connection. Behavior models score the requests themselves.
A better address changes less than most buyers expect. Most signals read the software or the path, and those stay the same whatever address you rent:
| Datacenter | ISP | Residential | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Known-proxy lists | yes | yes | yes |
| Hosting network | yes | Partly | no |
| Location by delay | Partly | Partly | no |
| TLS and HTTP/2 | yes | yes | yes |
| TCP stack | yes | yes | Partly |
| Timing gap | yes | yes | yes |
| Behavior | yes | yes | yes |
What a residential address changes is the cost of a mistake. Real households share these addresses, so a site that blocks one blocks them too. That is why Cloudflare judges each request. Our page on datacenter and residential proxies covers the rest of the difference.
Why do websites not block every proxy address?
Because addresses are shared, and a block lands on everyone behind one. Vasilis Giotsas and Marwan Fayed of Cloudflare wrote in 2025 that with carrier-grade NAT "a single IPv4 address may represent hundreds or even thousands of users". Those addresses are "subject to rate limiting three times more often" than others. "Blocking the shared IP therefore penalizes many innocent users along with the abuser."
Sivaramakrishnan Ramanathan and colleagues measured the same problem in blocklists for IMC 2020. Of 151 public IPv4 blocklists, about 60% held at least one NATed address and about 53% held at least one dynamic address. Those listings could hit as many as 78 users for as long as 44 days. The operators they surveyed often used such lists to block traffic directly.
So every signal on this page has a price for the site. A strict rule stops more proxies and also more real customers, and each site sets that balance for itself.
How to check what a site can see from your proxy
You need the proxy you use and a browser set up to use it. Then work through these checks:
- Look up the address the site sees. Connect through the proxy and open our IP lookup. Use the exit address it shows, not the gateway name you connect to. The result gives the network type and whether the address is a known proxy.
- Check the headers. Paste the proxy into our anonymity checker. It shows whether the proxy passes your address on, names a proxy, or adds nothing to a plain http request.
- Check for a WebRTC leak. Open our WebRTC leak test in the same browser. It shows whether the browser hands out an address other than the proxy's.
- Check the reputation. Our lookup gives no fraud verdict. FFraud's free proxy and VPN detection test shows whether an address is detected as a proxy, VPN, Tor node or datacenter host.
The checks have passed when the lookup shows the network you expect, the anonymity checker shows elite, and the leak test shows only the proxy's address. The common mistake is to check the gateway instead of the exit. A rotating proxy changes its exit, so check the address a site sees at that moment.
What this means if you buy proxies
Detection is the best reason to stay away from free proxies: 99.1% of the 7,251 working ones we checked on October 22, 2026 were already flagged. A residential proxy uses addresses that internet providers assign to home connections. These are still proxies, and the lists, timing and behavior checks above apply to them as well.
If a site's rules allow a proxy for your work, our residential proxies start at $0.50 for one GB.
What this page could not check
- We measured free public proxies only. We tested no paid proxy, no VPN and not our own network.
- The studies differ in age and setting. The location audit tested VPN services in 2018, Mi's residential count dates from the same years, and the TCP stack result comes from one private network. Read them as proof of method, and leave today's rates open.
- Xue's team tested obfuscated proxies from a censor's position. Applying that to a website is our reading.
- The table of signals by proxy type is our own summary. No study has tested all seven rows on all three types.
- We read only the abstract of the anti-bot paper, because the full text refused automated reads.
- Network type is our own best guess, so a few hosting networks may sit in the home and business group.
- The flags come from one IP reputation check. Other vendors can reach other verdicts, and none says how often it catches residential proxies.
- Sites do not say which signals they use or how they weigh them.
- The timing research is one group's work, and its threshold moves with mobile networks.
- We will check every number on this page again by February 2, 2027.
Sources
Standards
- Fielding, R., Nottingham, M. and Reschke, J. RFC 9110, HTTP Semantics. IETF, June 2022: the Via header and the CONNECT method.
- Petersson, A. and Nilsson, M. RFC 7239, Forwarded HTTP Extension. IETF, June 2014.
- Uberti, J. and Shieh, G. RFC 8828, WebRTC IP Address Handling Requirements. IETF, January 2021.
Papers
- Anderson, B. and McGrew, D. "OS Fingerprinting: New Techniques and a Study of Information Gain and Obfuscation." arXiv, June 2017.
- Azad, B. A., Starov, O., Laperdrix, P. and Nikiforakis, N. "Web Runner 2049: Evaluating Third-Party Anti-bot Services." DIMVA, 2020.
- Beverly, R., Phokeer, A. and Gasser, O. "WHEREIS: IP Address Registration Geo-Consistency." ACM Internet Measurement Conference, October 2026.
- Chiapponi, E., Dacier, M. and Thonnard, O. "Poster: The Impact of the Client Environment on Residential IP Proxies Detection." ACM Internet Measurement Conference, October 2023.
- Du, B., Fontugne, R., Testart, C., Snoeren, A. C. and claffy, kc. "Sublet Your Subnet: Inferring IP Leasing in the Wild." ACM Internet Measurement Conference, November 2024.
- Frolov, S. and Wustrow, E. "The use of TLS in Censorship Circumvention." Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, February 2019.
- Mi, X. et al. "Resident Evil: Understanding Residential IP Proxy as a Dark Service." IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2019.
- Ramanathan, S., Hossain, A., Mirkovic, J., Yu, M. and Afroz, S. "Quantifying the Impact of Blocklisting in the Age of Address Reuse." ACM Internet Measurement Conference, October 2020.
- Weinberg, Z., Cho, S., Christin, N., Sekar, V. and Gill, P. "How to Catch when Proxies Lie: Verifying the Physical Locations of Network Proxies with Active Geolocation." ACM Internet Measurement Conference, 2018.
- Xue, D., Stanley, R., Kumar, P. and Ensafi, R. "The Discriminative Power of Cross-layer RTTs in Fingerprinting Proxy Traffic." Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, February 2025.
- Ziv, M., Izhikevich, L., Ruth, K., Izhikevich, K. and Durumeric, Z. "ASdb: A System for Classifying Owners of Autonomous Systems." ACM Internet Measurement Conference, November 2021.
- EURECOM, US patent application 2023/0379363 A1, "Proxy detection systems and methods", November 23, 2023.
Vendor documents and reports
- Cloudflare, "Using machine learning to detect bot attacks that leverage residential proxies", June 24, 2024.
- Giotsas, V. and Fayed, M. "One IP address, many users: detecting CGNAT to reduce collateral effects." Cloudflare Blog, October 29, 2025.
- Cloudflare, Managed IP Lists, updated April 16, 2026.
- Cloudflare, "JA3/JA4 fingerprint", updated May 6, 2026.
- MaxMind, GeoIP Anonymous IP database documentation, read October 22, 2026.
- IP2Location, IP2Proxy database, read October 22, 2026.
- Spur, documentation home page, read October 22, 2026.
- Salesforce, JA3 README; FoxIO, JA4+ README; both read October 22, 2026.
- Akamai, "Passive Fingerprinting of HTTP/2 Clients", white paper, Black Hat Europe 2017.
- HTTP Archive, Web Almanac 2024, Security chapter, November 11, 2024.
- MDN, "Navigator.webdriver", updated November 5, 2024.
- FFraud, proxy and VPN detection test, read October 22, 2026.
Our own data
- HProxy, free proxy measurements of October 22, 2026, and our IP lookup capture of the same day.



